After the West extended additional sanctions against Belarus and following Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s big press conference on August 9, the Kremlin began signaling its readiness to implement the so-called Armenian model to resolve the political crisis in the country.
What do Lukashenka's statements about “exposed terrorist networks supported by the West” and the “attempt” on the propagandist Azaronak testify to?
The pressure on the regime from the three sides will only intensify.
The Belarusian authorities’ forced landing of the Vilnius-bound Ryanair Flight 4978 at Minsk airport, on May 23, and the arrest of the opposition NEXTA Telegram channel founder Roman Protasevich, who was traveling aboard the plane, raised the political crisis happening inside Belarus since last August to the top of the global agenda (see EDM, May 24, 25). Much uncertainty remains about which actors were actually behind this special operation not to mention their real motives and ultimate goals.
In a ritual that is becoming as frequent as it is increasingly empty, Alyaksandr Lukashenka is heading to Russia yet again to meet with Vladimir Putin.
The air forces of Russia and Belarus will begin joint air-defense missions out of one of the Belarusian airfields this summer.
As Belarus braced for a fresh round of protests this week and as opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya called for tough new sanctions against Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in a Congressional testimony, the Kremlin has been busy laying the groundwork to tighten its grip on Russia’s far smaller but strategically important western neighbor.
They went skiing. They rode snowmobiles. And they lauded their “strategic partnership and alliance,” pledging to deepen integration between their two countries.
Moscow is considering, among other things, rather tough approaches.
Although Belarus and China established diplomatic relations in 1992, and adopted a joint declaration on establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013, the most dynamic cooperation between Minsk and Beijing has been developing over the past few years.
China's interest in Belarus looks to be cooling despite its warm words for embattled strongman Alexander Lukashenko, who is attempting to withstand unprecedented protests and intense geopolitical pressure.
This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2020. It covers
the period from February 1, 2017 to January 31, 2019. The BTI assesses the transformation
toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries.
Since 2015 Kremlin consistently has reconsidered the terms and conditions of the strategic deal, cutting the level of integration subsidies and requiring deeper political, military, and economic integration from Belarus.
As of May 1, 2020, and in contrast to other investigated countries in this report (China, Russia, Hungary, Iran), Belarus hasn’t experienced either a peak of the COVID-19 epidemic or even approached it. Although Belarusian authorities have managed to contain the spread of the epidemic at the first stage without introduction of a nation-wide quarantine effort, the worst consequences are yet to come since the peak of the epidemic is expected in the beginning of June.
After Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka rejected the Kremlin’s so-called integration ultimatum at the end of 2019, and following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announced constitutional changes, the following January, to effectively reset his presidential term tally to zero, some experts argued that a forced unification scenario between Belarus and Russia within the Union State had become significantly less likely.
The comment of Director of Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies Arseny Sivitsky appeared in the March 2020 issue of Petroleum Review.
In response to Russia's efforts, Minsk seeks to reassert and enhance its commitments to regional and international security, while preserving and expanding Belarus’s strategic autonomy within the alliance with Russia.
In the mid-1990s, Minsk signed several treaties and agreements with Moscow that prioritized a pro-Russian geopolitical orientation...
Parliamentary elections are finally scheduled in Belarus.
Following predictions by Russian military intelligence (GRU) that the West wants to separate Belarus from Russia and incorporate it into the Western orbit...
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014 and the subsequent militarypolitical confrontation between Russia and the West marked the transition of Russia to a new strategic doctrine...
Belarus adopted a new Information Security Concept (ISC) on March 18, 2019, based on a resolution from the Belarus Security Council (President.gov.by, March 18)
Belarus wants to expand constructive dialogue with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the basis of trust, equality, transparency and mutual respect.
Belarus’s ongoing drive to cautiously normalize relations with the West has raised concerns from Russian military intelligence...
Arseny Sivitsky, Director of the Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, participated in the “Big Conversation with the President” of Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko — meeting with representatives of general public, expert community, Belarusian and foreign mass media.
The Kremlin’s concerns about maintaining Belarus within its geopolitical sphere of influence have been mounting as of late
Belarus further tightens control over its domestic political field. Without Russia’s support, the outlook for its economy is gloomy. Meanwhile, the standoff with Moscow switches from open to positional.
Four sacks of potatoes and a piece of lard were the Christmas gifts president Lukashenko brought for his meeting with Putin on December 29.
In December, the tensions of the past years in relations between Russia and Belarus entered a new stage growing into an open conflict. The Kremlin openly declared its ambitions of integrating Belarus. It conditioned discounts for oil and gas on deeper integration between Russia and Belarus within the Union State.