Publications in the media
While Russia and Belarus made final preparations to kick off their quadrennial joint strategic-operational exercise Zapad 2021, the two countries’ air-defense and air force units were put on joint duty as part of the recently established training and combat center in Grodno Oblast, in western Belarus.
After the West extended additional sanctions against Belarus and following Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s big press conference on August 9, the Kremlin began signaling its readiness to implement the so-called Armenian model to resolve the political crisis in the country.
What do Lukashenka's statements about “exposed terrorist networks supported by the West” and the “attempt” on the propagandist Azaronak testify to?
They went skiing. They rode snowmobiles. And they lauded their “strategic partnership and alliance,” pledging to deepen integration between their two countries.
In his video message marking the International Day of United Nations (UN) Peacekeepers on May 29, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ambassador to the UN Zhang Jun (张军) said that China is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) and will “implement its commitment to multilateralism and world peace with concrete actions and make greater contributions to peacekeeping operations for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Xinhua, May 30).
Although Belarus and China established diplomatic relations in 1992, and adopted a joint declaration on establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013, the most dynamic cooperation between Minsk and Beijing has been developing over the past few years.
China's interest in Belarus looks to be cooling despite its warm words for embattled strongman Alexander Lukashenko, who is attempting to withstand unprecedented protests and intense geopolitical pressure.
This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2020. It covers
the period from February 1, 2017 to January 31, 2019. The BTI assesses the transformation
toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries.
Since 2015 Kremlin consistently has reconsidered the terms and conditions of the strategic deal, cutting the level of integration subsidies and requiring deeper political, military, and economic integration from Belarus.
As of May 1, 2020, and in contrast to other investigated countries in this report (China, Russia, Hungary, Iran), Belarus hasn’t experienced either a peak of the COVID-19 epidemic or even approached it. Although Belarusian authorities have managed to contain the spread of the epidemic at the first stage without introduction of a nation-wide quarantine effort, the worst consequences are yet to come since the peak of the epidemic is expected in the beginning of June.
On May 20, the White House published a new policy document titled United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China. According to the document, China poses challenges to the economy, values, and security of the United States.
Yuri Tsarik on the Belarusian leadership’s faults and the role of Russia in the country’s election.
After Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka rejected the Kremlin’s so-called integration ultimatum at the end of 2019, and following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announced constitutional changes, the following January, to effectively reset his presidential term tally to zero, some experts argued that a forced unification scenario between Belarus and Russia within the Union State had become significantly less likely.
On the other hand, this also means that Belarus’s economic resilience has not been properly tested for a possible disruption of the economic cooperation with Russia yet.
The comment of Director of Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies Arseny Sivitsky appeared in the March 2020 issue of Petroleum Review.
Talks in Sochi last December confirmed that Belarusian-Russian relations have reached an impasse
Yuri Tsarik reflects on the negotiations held in Sochi on December 6-7
The domestic agenda remains focused on the upcoming election campaigns, while the government approach is growing tougher. In its foreign policy, Belarus bets on diversification and finds common ground with long-standing opponents.
Part six in the series ‘Russian Media: Moscow and Beyond Calling’: Russia’s information influence on Belarus
Last month saw the launch of campaigns for MPs in both chambers of Belarusian parliament, and the country’s continued active interaction with its partners in the international arena.
Analysis by Yuri Tsarik and László Vasa
Yuri Tsarik on the Kremlin’s strategy for “deepening integration” with Belarus
Parliamentary elections are finally scheduled in Belarus.
Following predictions by Russian military intelligence (GRU) that the West wants to separate Belarus from Russia and incorporate it into the Western orbit...
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014 and the subsequent militarypolitical confrontation between Russia and the West marked the transition of Russia to a new strategic doctrine...
Belarus adopted a new Information Security Concept (ISC) on March 18, 2019, based on a resolution from the Belarus Security Council (President.gov.by, March 18)
Yury Tsarik considers how and why Belarusian-Russian relations have hit a new low
March saw a shift of accents in the work of the government and media in Belarus. Excessive attention to tensions in Belarus-Russia relations in January-February was replaced by an emphasis on domestic and economic policies. However, these accents turned out to be mostly negatively colored as well.
What Belarus’ new Information Security Concept says and what consequences it will have for the evolution of its political regime
Belarus wants to expand constructive dialogue with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the basis of trust, equality, transparency and mutual respect.
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